Imperial Japan's Surrender -- August 1945

On Fri, 25 Feb 2005 20:08:25 -0000, "David B."
wrote:

 >Jack Love wrote in message ...
  >>
  >>On Thu, 24 Feb 2005 20:06:28 -0000, "David B."

   >>>
   >>>You may not have been following this thread very closely. I am inclined
   >>>towards your point-of-view, but others are suggesting that the Japanese
   >>>military elite might have attempted to continue the war regardless of the
   >>>effects on the general population if the Russians had not made their
 >swift
   >>>advance through Manchukuo in the same week as the A-bombings.
  >>
  >>Sorry...what did you say in the parts you snipped? I seem to have
  >>forgotten. Well, you left a sentence by mistake which refutes your
  >>current tap dance.
 >
 >Not a mistake on my part- probably a touch of mental inflexibility on
 >yours.
 >
  >>The militarists were not convinced
  >>(period). The 'peace party' such as it was got half the vote and the
  >>'militarists' continued to vote for continuation of te war.
 >
 >We're now in traditional problem territory for historical discussions.

The facts simply are the facts.

 > Some
 >people are reluctant to accept inferences not based on clearly visible
 >evidence- but experience of collective decision-making in our own lives
 >teaches us that the most important factors are not necessarily recorded. In
 >this case, given the known relationship between the military leadership and
 >the Emperor, it is probably legitimate to suspect that the latter only
 >intervened because one or more of the former, though outwardly maintaining
 >their "militant" viewpoint, made him aware that they would not object to
 >such intervention (of course, some certainly did object, but that's not the
 >point).

You're simply ignoring reality. In fact the Emperor had all power.
In fact traditionally he didn't use that power. In fact he had tried
on several occasions earlier to 'end the war' and the militarists had
interpreted his comments as 'strike a decisive blow'. In fact
his order was followed by two things a wave of suicides among
militarists protesting his decision (the traditional approach) and a
near rebellion to preven its observence.

   >>>All that said, I still think the timing of events leading up to the
   >>>surrender(s) of Japan, and the many effects of the decision to use the
   >>>A-bombs on large cities, are topics worthy of continuing study in
 >attempts
   >>>to understand the modern world.
  >>
  >>Drivel, the bombs were dropped at the earliest moment possible barring
  >>weather concerns.
  >>
  >>Note the time delta between the Trinity test and the Hiroshima attack
  >>and suggest how it could have been done faster.
 >
 >That's not the most relevant time period. What matters is that it would be
 >clear by the time of the Yalta meeting in February that the first bomb was
 >likely to be available in the summer- or not at all- so talks with Stalin
 >would take that into account.

Yalta had what to do with the A-Bomb and its use? NOTHING. The war
was going to end Stalin agreed to assist if it weren't over before he
could get there.


And...no, it was used as quickly as POSSIBLE to give the best chance
to either preclude Olympic/Coronet or reduce Japanese capabilities in
the interim.


 >
 >David B.
 >

Well, you're clearly a blockhead.

"David B." wrote in message

 > Jack Love wrote in message ...
  >>

 >
 > We're now in traditional problem territory for historical discussions.
 > Some
 > people are reluctant to accept inferences not based on clearly visible
 > evidence- but experience of collective decision-making in our own lives
 > teaches us that the most important factors are not necessarily recorded.
 > In
 > this case, given the known relationship between the military leadership
 > and
 > the Emperor, it is probably legitimate to suspect that the latter only
 > intervened because one or more of the former, though outwardly maintaining
 > their "militant" viewpoint, made him aware that they would not object to
 > such intervention (of course, some certainly did object, but that's not
 > the
 > point).
 >

This is precisely WRONG

We know very well what happened. Hirohito was indeed urged to intervene
but thus was done by Marquis Koichi Kido who was the Lord Keeper of
the Privy Seal. His role was to act as the liason between Government
and Emperor and he was also Hirohito's chief advisor and a personal
friend.

Three factors moved Kido to action for peace despite the knowledge that
this made him vulnerable to reprisals by the militarists.

1) Japan's lack of fighting power against the massive Allied forces
being readied for the invasion.

2) The Surrender of Germany left Japan fighting alone against
the western allies with no prospect of vctory

3) On June 8, 1945 the Japanese Armyhad pushed the government into
approving "The Fundamental Policy To Be Followed Henceforth in
the Conduct of the War". This made it Japan's official policy to
"prosecute the war to the bitter end".

We know all this from his post war testimony and his diaries.
Kido gathered support for it from Prime Minister Suzuki, Navy Minister
Yonai (the head of the Navy), and Foreign Minister Togo. This
grouping made up the peace movement.


With their backing Kido met with the emperor and requested that
he "directly express his desire for accelerating the peace" to the
Japanese government. The emperor took Kido's advice, and on
June 22, 1945 Hirohito asked the government to "end the war as
quickly as possible".


Still the militarists refused to surrender, even after the dropping of the
2 atomic bombs and the attack by the Soviets. On the morning of August 14th
Kido received word that U.S. planes were dropping leaflets on Japan
containing the U.S. and Japanese peace proposals.

Fearing a backlash by the Japanese military and that this presaged further
attacks, perhaps even the invasion, Kido rushed to advise the emperor,
in his own words, "to command the government without further loss of
time to go through the formalities for terminating the war".

This was an enormous break with all tradition and was an action
fraught with risk but the emperor agreed and sent Kido to make
the arrangements for the government to meet at which meeting
the emperor personally appeared and made the request.

see
Robert Butow, Japan's Decision To Surrender

University Publications of America, The Diary of Marquis Kido, 1931-45:
Selected Translations into English

U.S. Army, Far East Command, Statements of Japanese Officials on World War
II, National Archives


   >>>All that said, I still think the timing of events leading up to the
   >>>surrender(s) of Japan, and the many effects of the decision to use the
   >>>A-bombs on large cities, are topics worthy of continuing study in
 > attempts
   >>>to understand the modern world.
  >>
  >>Drivel, the bombs were dropped at the earliest moment possible barring
  >>weather concerns.
  >>
  >>Note the time delta between the Trinity test and the Hiroshima attack
  >>and suggest how it could have been done faster.
 >
 > That's not the most relevant time period. What matters is that it would be
 > clear by the time of the Yalta meeting in February that the first bomb was
 > likely to be available in the summer- or not at all- so talks with Stalin
 > would take that into account.
 >

In fact it was far from clear that the first bomb would be available by then
and more importantly it wasnt clear that the second and subsequent
plutonium bombs would work at all. That was only known after
the result of the Trinity test in July.

Most of those present at Yalta , including the joint chiefs, didnt
know the Manhattan programme existed at all. The Americans
requested Russian intervention and pressed them to do
so as soon as possible. The policy adopted at Yalta was
NOT predicated on a bomb being available.

Keith